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A NEW APPROACH FOR GAY AND LESBIAN DOMESTIC
PARTNERS: LEGAL ACCEPTANCE THROUGH
RELATIONAL PROPERTY THEORY
HARA JACOBS*
In the past twenty years, the number of couples living together on a
long-term basis without marrying has dramatically increased.' With the
increase in domestic partnerships2 has come new litigation in which one
scorned domestic partner sues the other, claiming a right to property
procured during the relationship. Often, one partner brought more present
or future financial resources to the relationship than the other. The wealthier
partner may have placed some or all of the property acquired during the
relationship in her name only for a variety of seemingly innocuous reasons
(e.g., business expertise, tax benefits, facilitation of financial management);
nonetheless, the result is that one partner has title to the assets while the
other partner has nothing. In fact, such a situation is similar to marriage,
where one spouse typically enters the union with more assets, business
expertise, or earning potential than the other. As this Note argues, the key
difference between spouses and domestic partners, however, is that marital
dissolution statutes protect spouses. Domestic partners must rely on scattered
judicial decisions which often do not agree on the proper theory a domestic
partner should advance in order to state a claim.
The problems a domestic partner faces are compounded when the
plaintiff making the property claim is gay or lesbian. Homosexuals are not a
protected class, which means that they can be discriminated against as long
as there is a rational basis for the statutory distinction and a legitimate
government interest. 3 In contrast to most opposite sex domestic partners,
gays and lesbians do not have the option to marry and thus cannot place
themselves under the purview of marital dissolution statutes. Society's scorn
and legal disabilities combine to produce a hostile atmosphere from which
the gay community needs protection. Arguably, the best protection is
acceptance, but acceptance will not occur until the law extends the same
level of recognition to gay and lesbian relationships as it does to opposite
sex relationships.
* J.D. 1994, Duke University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Laura
Underkuffler and Paul Millhouser for their valuable insights.
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1993
(113th ed.) 54, Table No. 62 (increasing from 523,000 in 1970 to 3,308,000 in 1992). See also
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 109 (Cal. 1976) (discussing the increase from 1950 to 1970).
2. Domestic partnership refers to either opposite or same sex couples who cohabit but
are not married.
3. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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This Note argues that gay and lesbian domestic partners deserve the
same level of protection in property distribution after dissolution of a
relationship that opposite sex partners receive. This is not to say that gays
and lesbians living together should fall under marital distribution statutes, or
that the privilege to marry should necessarily be extended to gays and
lesbians. Rather, this Note argues that courts should allow gays and lesbians
to advance a theory of relational property when making a property claim
against a former domestic partner. By allowing a relational property claim,
courts would acknowledge that gays and lesbians, like heterosexuals, have a
legitimate interest in property acquired during a relationship.
I. MARITAL DISTRIBUTION STATUTES
At common law, most states did not permit courts to distribute
property between spouses upon divorce.4 Instead, courts required the
husband to continue to financially support his wife by paying alimony. A
court's award of alimony did not alter title to property; a piece of property
in the husband's name remained his property, even if the wife had
contributed funds toward its acquisition.' Even at common law, however,
some states did not follow the "title" rule. Instead, these states derived their
law from French and Spanish civil law concepts of community property.6
The community property system recognizes marriage as an economic
partnership of equals.7 Since the parties are equal, property acquired during
the marriage (community property) should be distributed equally s However,
not all community property jurisdictions distribute community property
equally. About half of the jurisdictions require courts to distribute property
equitably.9
The policy of community property is equality:
The husband and wife are accorded the status of equals, because of the
actual contribution each makes to the marriage-because of their status as
partners in a marital partnership based on the view that two individuals are
equally devoting their lives and energies to -furthering the material as well
as the spiritual success of marriage."
Whatever is acquired by the joint efforts of the husband and wife is their
common property because the marriage is a community of which each
spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her industry to its
prosperity."
4. 1 ANN OLDFATHER ET. AL., VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY §3.02
(1984).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. §3.02[21.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & WILLIAM Q. DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE U.S. 13
(1975).
11. Id. at 4.
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Today, almost every state divides marital property upon divorce
according to either the principles of community property or equitable
distribution. 2 Equitable distribution is based on principles similar to those
underlying community property, 3 and recognizes that marriage is an
economic partnership of equals and not the union of a male dominant
provider and a dependant female. 4
Equitable distribution assumes that assets acquired by the parties while
the partnership lasted were obtained by the joint effort of both parties, and
thus should be distributed equitably upon dissolution. 5 Assets acquired
before marriage, or those acquired without any effort by either party (e.g., a
gift or inheritance received by one party only) do not represent the fruit of
their joint efforts. 16 Most states exclude these assets from equitable
distribution and label them the separate property of the recipient spouse. 7
Today, state statutes govern the distribution of property upon divorce.
For the purposes of this discussion, it does not matter whether a state
adopts equitable distribution or community property, because both systems
are based on the same principles. Statutory schemes for the distribution of
marital property recognize that marriage is a partnership of two individuals
who each contribute to the partnership's prosperity; assets acquired by the
effort of either spouse during the marriage are considered marital property.
The relationship-the marriage-essentially creates an entirely new category
of property: marital property. By grouping particular assets and placing a
label on them, legislators formally recognize that traditional notions of title
ownership do not apply when distributing property among individuals in a
marital relationship. Instead, legislators use the relationship itself to govern
the distribution of property. It is the relationship that leads legislators to
ignore conventional theories of property, and instead, create a new concept
which I shall term "relational property." 8 This Note argues that relational
property is an appropriate theory to apply to property claims arising from
the dissolution of gay and lesbian domestic partnerships.
12. OLDFATHER, supra note 4, §3.02[l]-[3).
13. A community property jurisdiction that distributes property equitably should not be
confused with an equitable distribution jurisdiction. Community property jurisdictions govern
the disposition of community property throughout the marriage, while equitable distribution
jurisdictions do not distinguish separate property from marital property until the parties seek
dissolution. Thus, a spouse in a community property jurisdiction that distributes property
equitably cannot will more than half her share of the community property, even if more than
half the community property is titled in her name. See OLDFATHER ET AL., supra note 4,
§20.05[2]. Equitable distribution jurisdictions have no such restrictions. Id.
14. Id. §3.02[1].
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. This term has been used by Professor Laura Underkuffler, of Duke University School
of Law, to describe the kinds of interests that courts have recognized in cases which involve
relationships between people-interests that do not appear to be otherwise captured by
conventional theories such as contract, trust, unjust enrichment, or quantum meruit.
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II. RELATIONAL PROPERTY THEORY
Relational property describes the situation in which the existence of a
relationship between people creates a new and distinct category of property.
Each party to the relationship has an ownership interest in any property
placed in this new category; the extent of ownership is determined by the
nature of the relationship. Unlike a court awarding property in a contract or
fraud case, a court invoking relational property does not take property
labeled in Jane's name and give it to John. Rather, the court takes property
titled in the name of one person and recasts the property as an asset of the
relationship, in which both parties have an interest. Marital distribution
statutes formally recognize the concept of relational property by stating that
property acquired by one spouse, and titled in the name of that spouse, is
really a marital asset in which both parties have an interest.
Marital distribution statutes are not commonly regarded as legally
recognizing a new form of property interest. The statutes are simply seen as
a state legislature's answer to the tricky ordeal of doling out the goods of
defunct families. The mechanisms under which marital distribution statutes
operate, however, support the argument that the statutes represent legislative
recognition of relational property. 9 As previously stated, current
distribution schemes are based on the idea that the husband and wife are
partners in a marital partnership, and both are equally devoting their lives
to furthering the material and spiritual success of the marriage." It is the
relationship that fuels the desire to increase the material wealth of the
marital community. The laws assume that during the marriage, each spouse
is working for the community and thus any profits are community profits.
However, assets acquired during the marriage that did not require the effort
of either spouse are not considered marital property because there was no
effort expended on behalf of the relationship. Likewise, assets acquired
before the marriage are also not labeled marital property. Since no legally
recognized community existed at the time the assets were acquired, the
effort expended to produce those assets could not have been effort on behalf
of the community. Thus, marital distribution statutes will not label property
19. One could argue that statutory marital disposition schemes do not recognize relational
property, but merely protect the interests of the weaker spouse. In other words, by permitting
one spouse to claim an interest in property acquired during the marriage, the legislature
shields a homemaker spouse from economic disaster upon divorce, while simultaneously
protecting the state's interest in keeping citizens off the welfare rolls. This argument, however,
fails to explain why certain property is excluded from distribution under marital dissolution
statutes. If protection is the goal of these statutes, why not include gifts or inheritance
acquired after the marriage? Further, many distribution schemes do not protect spouses in
marriages of short duration or marriages between retired individuals because in both
circumstances little property is acquired during the marriage. Thus, there are few assets
available for distribution to the homemaker spouse. Certainly, protecting a spouse from
economic disaster is a consideration for legislatures when adopting a distribution scheme.
However, the protection theory cannot offer an explanation nearly as coherent as relational
property theory.
20. REPPY, supra note 10, at 13.
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marital property unless there was a relationship at the time the property was
acquired to create the property interest.
Courts have also used the concept of relational property when faced
with a novel claim in the "outer-bounds" of recognized property. One
common example is when one spouse claims an interest in the advanced
degree of the other soon to be ex-spouse. Typically, it is the wife who works
to put her husband through a graduate program, such as medical school or
law school. Either shortly before or shortly after graduation, the couple
separates. The student spouse leaves the relationship with his advanced
degree and increased earning potential, while the working spouse leaves
with little money or property, having spent her earnings and energy
supporting the family. The pivotal issue in these cases is whether the
working spouse can claim a property interest in the advanced degree of the
student spouse.
Although several courts have held that an advanced degree is not
property,2 these same courts have used their equity powers to compensate
the working spouse for her educational contributions.' Several courts have
reasoned that, in some circumstances, an advanced degree is a marital asset,
acquired by the joint sacrifice and effort of both spouses:'
In the instant case, these assets (medical degree and license) were produced
by the combined efforts of the husband, by his application of his abilities
and diligence, and by the contributions of the wife as homemaker and
mother as well as [eighty percent] of the income during the period these
assets were acquired."
Other courts have been even more explicit in defining when a student
spouse's professional degree will be characterized as a marital asset.
Specifically, the court in Postema v. Postema" held that an advanced degree
would be considered a marital asset, subject to distribution, if the degree
was the end product of a concerted family effort.26 The court explained:
[Ilt is not the existence of an advanced degree itself that gives rise to an
equitable claim for compensation, but rather the fact of the degree being the
end product of the mutual sacrifice, effort, and contribution of both parties
21. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
608-09 (2d ed. 1988). But see O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that a
license to practice medicine is property subject to equitable distribution).
22. Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Ky. 1985) (holding that a professional degree is
a relevant factor to be considered in determining the standard of living established during the
marriage); De La Rosa v. De La Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 1981) (awarding wife
money for contributions made to husband's education); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527,
534 (N.J. 1982) (holding that wife should receive reimbursement alimony to cover all financial
contributions towards her husband's education).
23. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d at 332; Postema v. Postema, 471 N.W.2d 912, 915 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991).
24. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d at 332.
25. 471 N.W.2d 912 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
26. Id. at 918.
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as part of a larger, long-range plan intended to benefit the family as a
whole."
The import of the court's language in Lovett and Postema is that the conduct
of the parties in a marital relationship determines whether an advanced
degree is characterized as the educational achievement of the student spouse,
or as the product of both spouses. Thus, it is the relationship between the
individuals that has the power to transform a graduate school diploma into
a marital asset.
III. CURRENT APPROACH TO DOMESTIC PARTNER PROPERTY CLAIMS
Legislatures and courts have applied a relational based property
approach to the problems of married couples, but have not taken such an
enlightened view when faced with the problems of domestic partners.
Although many courts permit domestic partners to make property claims
against former partners, in order to succeed, claimants must prove the
existence of an express or implied contract. Thus, courts frame relationships
between unmarried cohabitants not as "all for one and one for all," but
instead as a barter exchange system where services are rendered only
because money is promised in return.
Marvin v. Marvin' is the seminal case in the area of property claims by
a domestic partner. Marvin established that a domestic partner may claim a
property interest in assets held by the other partner provided the claimant
can show first, that an express or implied agreement existed, and second,
that the rendering of sexual services did not form an inseparable part of
their agreement.29 Michelle, the plaintiff in Marvin, claimed she had an oral
agreement with her partner, actor Lee Marvin, that while "the parties lived
together they would combine their efforts and earnings and would share
equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts whether
individual or combined."' They further agreed that Michelle would render
her services as companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook to defendant.
In return, Lee agreed to financially support Michelle for the rest of her
life."'
These two portions of Michelle and Lee's oral agreement reflect
crucially different approaches to property distribution in a relationship. The
former portion, discussing joint effort and sharing, combines contract theory
with a relational based property approach. The couple agrees to individually
strive to accumulate property that will be shared by the whole. In other
words, assets acquired by either party during the relationship become the
property of both parties. The latter portion of the agreement, however,
embodies a traditional contractual approach where one party promises
services and the other party promises money. The Supreme Court of
27. Id. at 915.
28. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
29. See id. at 114.
30. Id. at 110.
31. Id.
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California had both claims before it and could have adopted either approach.
The court chose the more traditional contractual approach and stressed that
domestic partners may make express or implied contracts for the distribution
of property upon dissolution.32
Marvin also established that a plaintiff may recover in quantum meruit
for the reasonable value of household services rendered.33 Quantum meruit
is arguably the theory farthest removed from relational property; in quantum
meruit it is not the relationship which allows the plaintiff to make a claim,
rather it is the services rendered. When a plaintiff makes a quantum meruit
claim, courts treat the plaintiff no differently than any other general
contractor. For example, a plaintiff alleges that she rendered household
services worth $5,000 and expected to be paid, while the defendant accepted
the services expecting to pay for them. The court may find that by
supporting the plaintiff, the defendant has already paid her $3,000, and,
therefore, owes the plaintiff $2,000. The point is that the existence of the
domestic partnership is inconsequential to the application of quantum
meruit.
Although Marvin involved a heterosexual couple, the principle has been
extended to situations involving gay and lesbian couples, albeit
inconsistently.' While the court in Marvin permitted Michelle's claim,
which included services clearly intertwined with cohabitation, such as
homemaking and cooking,5 lower courts have rejected claims by gays and
lesbians where the services rendered were not separate from cohabitation.'
In Jones v. Daly,' the parties had an agreement whereby Daly gave the
plaintiff a monthly allowance and the plaintiff rendered services as a lover,
companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook. The court attached itself
to the term "lover" and refused the plaintiff's claim, reasoning that sexual
services to Daly comprised an inseparable part of the consideration for the
cohabitation agreement.39 Though the court in Jones mentions Marvin, the
court does not distinguish Marvin because it cannot. Michelle promised to be
Lee's companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook. Jones promised to be
Daly's lover, companion, homemaker, traveling companion, housekeeper, and
cook. Michelle gave up her modeling career; Jones gave up his. Both were
promised financial support for the rest of their lives. The only significant
difference between the two laundry lists of promises is the word "lover."
Perhaps the judge in Jones could not grasp the idea that a man would
render household services for another man and expect monetary support in
32. See id. at 122.
33. Id. at 122-123.
34. Kristin Bullock, Comment, Applying Marvin v. Marvin To Same Sex Couples: A Proposal
for a Sex-Preference Neutral Cohabitation Contract Statute, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029, 1045
(1992).
35. 557 P.2d at 110.
36. See Jones v. Daly, 122 Cal. App. 3d 500, 508 (1981).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 505.
39. Id. at 508.
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return. Compare Whorton v. Dillingham,4° where the court did allow a gay
cohabitant to make a claim against his former partner even though the
plaintiff promised to be the defendant's lover. In Whorton, however, the
plaintiff also promised to be the defendant's bodyguard, chauffeur, social
and business secretary, partner and counselor in real estate investments, and
constant companion-services unrelated to the cohabitation.'
The real problem with the Jones decision is not that the court fished out
the word "lover" from the cohabitation agreement. The problem is that
domestic partnerships are framed as economic barter systems. The message
that Marvin, Jones, and Whorton send to gay and lesbian cohabitants is that if
you are the financially dependent partner and you anticipate filing a
property claim against your partner in the future, you need to prepare a
laundry list of services that correspond with contemporary gender roles.
Following Marvin, litigants and courts latched on to traditional
contractual arrangements in which the plaintiff argues, "I rendered services
in return for a promised monetary reward."42 One reason litigants have
adopted this approach may be the portion of the Marvin decision which held
that a plaintiff can recover based on a quantum meruit theory. It is easier to
establish that services were rendered for which one expected compensation
and was not compensated, than to argue the existence of a contract. A
quantum meruit claim is easier to prove, but assertion of such a theory
inherently denigrates the relationship; the plaintiff necessarily must argue
that the relationship was no more than a barter exchange system. Thus love
and sharing are not the bases of a gay or lesbian domestic partnership,
instead one partner renders household services only in return for monetary
gratification.
Not all gay and lesbian plaintiffs with property claims against former
partners have resorted to the barter exchange argument seen in Jones and
Whorton. Some plaintiffs have argued that the partners agreed to share all
property accumulated during their relationship. Typically, these are plaintiffs
who contributed money toward a large asset, such as a house. The
argument is essentially that a contract existed, and the contract itself relies
on the character of the relationship. In other words, the contract and
resulting status of the relevant property is based on notions of relational
property. The parties agree at the outset that the relationship creates a new
form of property that is owned jointly; the parties agree to share the joint
property equally.' This type of contractual agreement parallels marital
40. 202 Cal. App. 3d 447 (Ct. App. 1988).
41. Id. at 450.
42. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill.
1979); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987).
43. See Ireland v. Flanagan, 627 P.2d 496 (Or. App. 1981) (plaintiff contributed $2,000
towards the $7,000 down payment on a house); Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982) (plaintiff alleged that she and her partner shared the transaction costs of the
residence they purchased).
44. This argument parallels Michelle's first argument in Marvin. See supra text
accompanying note 30.
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dissolution statutes in that both require former partners to share property
accumulated during the relationship, regardless of who holds legal title.
In Ireland v. Flanagan,5 the plaintiff asserted that she and her lesbian
lover had an express oral agreement to pool all their assets for their joint
benefit. The parties testified that they maintained a joint checking account,
joint savings account, a safety deposit box, joint loans, and joint credit
cards.46 The court found that the parties did intend to pool their resources
for their mutual benefit and therefore also intended joint ownership of the
house purchased during their relationship, even though the house was titled
in the defendant's name only.4
7
One could argue that the Ireland court's approach truly benefits gay and
lesbian domestic partners. The plaintiff's property claim was based on the
theory that the couple agreed to work together for the community and to
share equally in the property acquired during their relationship. Thus, the
court permitted a lesbian domestic partner to advance a property claim
based on a cross between contract and relational property theory. In
addition, the court's remedy, awarding joint ownership of the house, is
strikingly similar to the remedy that would occur under a marital
distribution statute. The only difference here is that a plaintiff must show
that the couple had previously contracted to conduct themselves in
accordance with the relational property notions that underlie marital
distribution statutes. Ireland is problematic because it tells gay and lesbian
cohabitants that they must explicitly contract in advance if they want to be
protected-mere commitment to the relationship will not be sufficient.
By requiring parties to contract in advance, courts ignore the simple
realities of love and relationships. First, couples in love generally do not
exercise the best judgment and are unlikely to exercise clear foresight.
Second, even couples thinking with clear heads will not want to consider the
possibility of breaking up. In fact, the mere act of contracting for possible
dissolution could cause otherwise happy couples to break up during contract
negotiations. Third, and most important, the party who needs the law's
protection is most likely the party without the knowledge, resources, or
power to obtain the requisite contractual agreement. The domestic partner
who files a property claim against his or her ex-partner is uniformly the
partner who came to the relationship with substantially fewer financial
resources and presumably less business expertise. Ireland requires the less
sophisticated and financially dependent partner to get an agreement from the
individual in command of the purse strings. Ultimately, Ireland is not helpful
for gay and lesbian domestic partners because it erects a practically
insurmountable barrier in front of the party who most needs the court's
protection.
Contrast the above scenario with marital distribution statutes-as
previously explained, equitable distribution and community property protect
economically dependent spouses. The party at financial risk is thus the
45. 627 P.2d 496, 497 (Or. App. 1981).
46. Id. at 498.
47. Id. at 500.
168 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY
individual who brings more money to the marriage. For example, suppose a
wealthy woman with two children intends to marry a middle class man. The
woman wants her children to inherit her fortune. Here, it is the wealthy
woman who is most at risk because, under marital dissolution statutes, her
new husband may gain rights to a substantial amount of her property. Thus,
if she wants to protect her assets, she must get a prenuptial agreement from
her fiancee. The marital dissolution statutes make sense because they protect
dependent spouses automatically; the more economically stable individual is
placed at risk, but this individual is also the one more likely to have the
knowledge and resources to protect herself.
Ireland's requirement that parties contract in advance also does not seem
logical when contrasted with the advanced degree cases. The lesbian couple
in Ireland purchased a home using both of their assets, and titled the home
in the name of one partner.4s In the advanced degree cases, the working
spouse uses her assets to support both parties, while the student spouse
obtains a professional degree. In both cases, you have individuals who used
their financial resources to help obtain a material benefit for the relationship.
And, in both cases, the plaintiff claims that this material benefit, titled in the
name of her ex-spouse/partner, is really a common asset. Courts in the
advanced degree cases do not require a working spouse to establish that she
had a contract with the student spouse in which she promised to support
him if he promised to share the fruits of his degree. Instead, courts look at
the conduct of the spouses, infer that both parties were working to benefit
the family, and as a result, label the advanced degree a marital asset. The
situation in Ireland is no different than the advanced degree cases, and is
arguably more compelling. An advanced degree, at best, lies at the "outer-
bounds" of property. It cannot be sold or transferred, and it terminates upon
the death of the holder.49 Houses, on the other hand, fit squarely within the
basic principles of property, and it is common practice for more than one
person to have a property interest in a home, especially among couples. A
finding that someone who supports a student's education has a property
interest in the student's degree represents a substantially more drastic
alteration of conventional property notions than does a recognition that two
people intended joint ownership of a house. It does not make sense for a
court to be so wary of a joint ownership claim in the context of a same sex
relationship that it requires evidence of an affirmative contract, yet in the
context of a marital relationship be willing to grant a plaintiff an interest in
something as intangible as a diploma, based solely upon the behavior of the
parties in the relationship.
IV. A NEW APPROACH FOR GAY AND LESBIAN DOMESTIC PARTNERS
As discussed above, a few courts have been willing to entertain
property claims when one partner alleges that the couple contracted to share
the property accumulated during the relationship in accordance with
48. Id. at 498.
49. Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 531.
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relational property theory. Even courts allowing such claims, however, have
not bestowed upon gay and lesbian relationships the same level of legal
acceptance granted to heterosexual couples. In other words, a court does not
permit the property claim because it sees the gay or lesbian domestic
partnership as the type of relationship which creates property rights. Instead,
courts merely acknowledge the existence of the relationship and allow a
property claim only where an affirmative contract existed to govern the
disposition of property acquired during the relationship. If courts truly
acknowledged that a gay or lesbian relationship itself created property
rights, then courts would not force plaintiffs to prove the existence of such a
contract. Until the law recognizes that gay and lesbian relationships can
create relational property, same sex couples will not posses the same legal
interest in their relationships as opposite sex couples; gays and lesbians will
continue to be barred from bringing any claim based on participation in a
relationship. One example is the fact that gay and lesbian domestic partners
are barred from bringing a loss of consortium claim.
A loss of consortium claim usually arises when one spouse is injured
by a tortfeasor, and the healthy spouse sues the tortfeasor for the loss of
"love, companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, solace, and
more."' The claim originated at common law, in which the law regarded a
wife as the chattel of her husband. An individual who injured a married
woman essentially injured the property of the husband. Thus, the husband
could sue the tortfeasor, claiming an injury to property. Later, courts
extended the claim so that a wife could sue for loss of consortium if a
tortfeasor injured her husband."' By extending the loss of consortium claim
to women, courts abandoned the notion that the suit was based on a pure
property theory. The modern view is that consortium is a package of
relational interests."2
Loss of consortium is a true relational property claim; the marital
relationship allows a spouse to sue someone who interferes with particular
assets of the marriage: love, companionship, emotional support, and sexual
relations. As opposed to common law loss of consortium, in the modem
action the property interfered with is not the spouse, instead it is the
relationship and the attributes that flow from the relationship. Generally, a
plaintiff cannot state a claim for loss of consortium unless the plaintiff was
married to the injured party at the time of the injury.53 There has been only
one case, Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange County," in which a court
specifically held that a domestic partner could sue for loss of consortium,
and that case was later overturned by the California Supreme Court.55
50. Briggs v. Butterfield Memorial Hosp., 104 A.D.2d 626 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
51. See Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange County, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 60 (1983),
overruled by Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
52. Elden, 758 P.2d at 592 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
53. CLARK, supra note 21, at 393. See also Elden, 758 P.2d at 589.
54. 139 Cal. App. 3d at 70.
55. Elden, 758 P.2d at 589.
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In Butcher, Cindy Forte, the plaintiff, lived with the injured Paul Forte
for eleven and a half years.' The couple never legally married, but they
considered themselves married and referred to each other as husband and
wife.57 They had two children together, filed joint tax returns, and
maintained joint bank accounts.' The California Court of Appeals held that
a cohabitant may state a claim for loss of consortium if the plaintiff can
show that the relationship is both stable and significant." A plaintiff can
demonstrate stability and significance with the following factors: the duration
of the relationship, a mutual contract, the degree of economic cooperation
and entanglement, exclusivity of sexual relations, and whether there are
other elements of a family relationship.' The key here is establishing that
the parties' relationship is parallel to a marital relationship.6
The Butcher decision percolated in the California lower courts for five
years until the California Supreme Court overruled it in Elden v. Sheldon.62
In Elden, the court explicitly refused to allow loss of consortium to domestic
partners. The reasons cited by the court included: desire for a narrowly
circumscribed cause of action, concern over the number of plaintiffs who
could sue for a loved one, state interest in promoting the responsibility of
marriage, and the difficulty in assessing a cohabitant relationship to
determine if it was the equivalent of a marriage.' The court specifically
stated that its decision was not based on a value judgment regarding the
morality of unmarried cohabitants."
The dissent argued that the majority was wrong not to extend loss of
consortium to cohabitants. The dissent stressed that a valid legal marriage
should not be a prerequisite because loss of consortium is no longer based
on a husband's proprietary interest in his wife.65 Consortium is a package
of relational interests including love, companionship, emotional support, and
sexual relations.' "The marital status of the plaintiff has no more bearing
on his or her standing to claim injury to these interests than does age or
socioeconomic status."'67 Thus, even though a bright line rule such as no
marriage-no recovery is clear and convenient, it fails because it is arbitrary
and unrelated to the relational basis of loss of consortium.'
The Elden majority stated that their decision to restrict loss of
consortium to spouses did not reflect a value judgment regarding the
morality of domestic partnerships.69 However, the very fact that the court
56. 139 Cal. App. 3d at 60.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 71.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
63. Id. at 586-588.
64. Id. at 587.
65. Id. at 594.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 588.
69. Id.
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refused to acknowledge that unmarried individuals can possess the same
level of interest in their relationships as married couples is evidence of a
biased value judgment against domestic partnerships. The Elden decision tells
heterosexual domestic partners that they have no interest in love and
companionship unless they get married. And what is even worse is the
message the Elden decision sends to gays and lesbians. Since same sex
marriage is not legal, gays and lesbians can never have an interest in the
love and companionship of a partner, regardless of the circumstances
surrounding the relationship. Rationales such as judicial economy and the
desire to limit the scope of a claim cannot support a decision that takes one
class of people and wholly invalidates their interest in a significant
relationship. Courts should, as in Butcher, look at the relationship, and how
the parties conduct themselves, both socially and financially. The claim arises
solely from the relationship, so let each relationship dictate the result.
Butcher's approach to loss of consortium claims applies equally well to
property claims by former domestic partners. If a plaintiff wants to claim
that property titled in the name of her ex-partner really belongs to the
community, then let the plaintiff prove that their relationship was the type
of relationship that created joint property. Essentially, the plaintiff would
argue that the domestic partnership was a significant-established °
relationship that paralleled a marriage.7 Thus, a plaintiff alleging that the
partnership was a significant-established relationship would point to first, the
duration of the relationship; second, the degree of economic cooperation and
entanglement; and third, whether the couple held themselves out as a
family-like entity. A plaintiff who met the threshold burden of showing a
significant-established relationship could then argue that property acquired
during the relationship belonged to both partners. Of course, a plaintiff
would still be free to argue that the parties contracted to share property or
that they agreed one party would render services in return for monetary
compensation.
Those who argue that an examination of this sort is too difficult or too
time consuming for courts ignore the reality of divorce litigation. Even
though marital dissolution statutes outline a general distribution scheme for
marital property, courts still must examine the intricacies of the marital
70. The Butcher court used the phrase "stable and significant", but since a plaintiff here
would be arguing about a defunct relationship, the word "stable" is probably not the most
appropriate terminology. Instead a plaintiff could argue that the dissolved domestic
partnership was a significant-established relationship. Whatever terminology courts and
litigants adopt, the factors listed by Butcher to identify a stable and significant relationship
would remain. Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 70.
71. This is not to say that marital conduct is a prerequisite for the creation of relational
property. A couple may not act like a typical married couple, and yet, each person may build
expectations based on the relationship that merits the protection afforded by relational
property theory. The reality, however, is that courts dislike expanding the scope of protected
property interests for fear that litigants will stampede the courthouse. Marriage provides the
courts with an excellent example of a relationship that creates the type of reliance courts
strive to protect. Further, courts are exceedingly familiar with the concept of marriage and
might be more likely to entertain relational property claims if an integral part of the legal
analysis involves a concept with which courts are well acquainted.
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relationship from the first day to D-day. It is simply impossible to divide
property equitably without knowing who brought what to the marriage;
family law is messy and courts engage in intensely factual examinations all
the time. In fact, many of these factual examinations are considerably more
time consuming than deciding whether a relationship meets the significant-
established threshold. To deny gay and lesbian relationships acceptance on
the basis that courts will be required to make difficult decisions is no
different than denying all men custody of their children because custody
decisions are too factually intensive for judges.
